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Abstract 
The estimation of the noise impact caused by road freight transportation is critical to have 
acknowledgment of the ambiance pollution caused by road traffic crossing geographical areas 
containing important natural resources. Thus, our work proposes a within-subject survey where a 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is combined with a laboratory economic experimental auction. 
Our study objective is to measure the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reducing traffic noise nuisances 
due to freight transportation in the region of Navarre, Spain. A special focus is made regarding the 
measurement of the hypothetical bias, when a comparison is done between hypothetical WTP, coming 
from the CVM study, with real-incentivized one, as the outcome of the economic experiment. 
Additionally, statistical analyses are conducted in order to find explanation factors for these outcomes. 
Results suggest a strong evidence for an upward hypothetical bias (from 50% to 160%) indicating the 
income, the educational level, the gender, and the age as the main factors which explain that bias. 
Keywords: Willingness-To-Pay; Transportation Externality; Noise; Contingent Valuation Method; 
Laboratory Economic Experiment 



















After the industrial revolution, freight transportation became a key sector in industrialized countries, 
as a basic determinant for economic and social activities. This key role of transportation has been 
enhanced in the European Union during the period 1990-2015 with the development of new 
transportation regulations. The transportation main function is connecting consumers and producers by 
promoting specialization and accessibility to a wide variety of merchandises. Moreover, from the 
social point of view, the importance of leisure-relat d activities makes transport an essential action for 
human relationships development.   
Furthermore, time and cost savings, among others, are the direct benefits derived from freight 
transportation system, which presents a greater intest in transport literature. However, the real cost 
of moving freight from the raw material sources, the manufacturing or distribution centers and to 
consumers is borne not only by the stakeholders, such as logistic company owners, but also by other 
members of society who may not benefit directly from these movements. In the economic literature, 
this is known as negative externalities (Demir et al., 2015). Additionally, following some meaningful 
authors (Xiao et al. 2012; Demir et al. 2014; Perven t al. 2017), the consideration of this kind of 
nonconventional costs has traditionally been scarce nd its analysis has not reached the depth that its 
significance would be advisable. 
Negative externalities are particularly significant in road transportation crossing geographical areas of 
special natural value. One of these areas are the Pyrenees in Europe, natural border between Spain and 
France, which has also a high density of road traffic, mainly trucks. In fact, more than 140,000 
vehicles cross daily the Pyrenees (circa 90% using the two main motorways which reach the border in 
Irún-Behovia and La Junquera, Western and Eastern ext emes of the mountainous range respectively), 
being freight trucks almost 30,000 of them (Spanish-French Observatory of Pyrenees Traffic, 2015). 
Moreover, the noise and air pollution costs are, at le st, four times higher in mountainous areas in 
comparison with flat areas (INFRAS, 2017). Similarly, Demir et al. (2015) listed some negative 
externalities associated to freight transportation such as noise or air pollution (mainly CO2 emissions). 
Thus, these authors provided a selection of models to measure, at different levels of accuracy, their 
impacts in terms of decibels, in the case of noise, or fuel consumption, when estimating CO2 
emissions. Nevertheless, there is not enough literature to reach a consensus regarding the economic 
values of these freight transport externalities since the valuation processes are data-intensive and 
requires a good deal of subjective judgement (McKinnon et al., 2015). 
These economic values are indeed a necessity if public authorities want the implementation of cost-
benefit analyses in possible regulations, levels for taxes and subsidies, or in transport infrastructures 
investments. In this case, implementing efficient transport systems need proper adequate assessment 















marginal costs, as the sum of marginal private costs and of marginal external costs (Nijkamp et al, 
2003; Willis, 2005). Likewise, it is necessary to consider that there are many different ways to assign 
monetary values to externalities, but most of them followed the methodology called ‘Damage 
Function Approach’ (Adamowicz, 2003) that assumes that he externality damage has already been 
done. However, in most cases, the damage caused by logistic activities in the environment cannot be 
directly observed. This is often developed using the so-called ‘Impact Pathway Approach’ (European 
Commission, 2003). This scheme begins with the calcul tion of emissions originated from logistic 
activities, tracking their diffusion and, in the case of gases, their chemical conversion and 
concentration at different spatial scales. Usually, the following step is a review of the receptors’ 
response, such as people, animals, vegetation, physical objects, to these emissions. These responses 
will normally be negative, representing a welfare loss. Hereafter, those losses have to be quantified 
and translated into monetary values to consider them into public decision-making processes during the 
implementation of transport policies. 
Overall, there are two valuation methods in externalities costs estimations (Boyle, 2003). The first one 
is related to Revealed Preference (RP) studies in wh ch an environmental cost is inferred from current 
changes in people’s behavior (using, for example, th  hedonic pricing methods, see e.g., Andersson et 
al., 2010). The second one is the Stated Preference (SP) surveys, in which participants are asked for 
their willingness-to-pay (WTP) in order to remove an externality, or at least to mitigate its negative 
effects. The WTP methodology looks for the maximum monetary amount that an individual is willing 
to pay to avoid an undesirable event (Wang et al., 2018; Bazrbachi et al., 2017). The Contingent 
Valuation Method (CVM) is often used, consisting in a stated-preference technique in which 
respondents are asked for their willingness to pay to pass from a current environmental scenario to a 
contingent (hypothetical) one with better environmetal characteristics.  
The CVM, however, presents some drawbacks due to the fact that the survey context could be 
considered to be artificial because the respondents’ real WTPs may be different from what they are 
answering. Concerning this methodology, there had been a large discussion in the literature regarding 
the concept of “hypothetical bias” that states a potential gap between real and hypothetical individual 
economic valuations (Murphy et al., 2005). Carson and Groves (2007) have argued that the correct 
opposition between methods is about the consequences of the survey. Actually, as defined by Carson 
and Groves (2007), a survey is ‘consequential’ if (i) the agent answering a preference survey question 
must view their responses as potentially influencing the agency’s actions, and (ii) the agent needs to 
care about what the outcomes of those actions might be. If one of the previous conditions is absent, 
then the survey is ‘inconsequential’. It could be disputable to consider that stated preference in a CVM 
survey are really consequential, given that participants do not know precisely how, when and how 
much the possible policies/actions will impact their personal situation regarding the peculiar problem 
they are asked about. Nevertheless, these possible consequences are rarely explicitly and precisely 















experimental economics method for two reasons. The first one is the implementation of immediate and 
real outcomes (money) for noise reduction scenarios depending on participants’ choices. The second 
one is to enable a group decision-making process for resources that should be used for increasing a 
public commodity related to noise mitigation. On one hand, the motivation of the current study is 
based on the importance of noise in road transportation nd its difficulty of estimation of the payment 
for the noise abatement in areas of great environmental impact as the Pyrenees Mountains. On the 
other hand, the main contribution is that, to the best of authors’ knowledge, this paper is the only one
to use an experimental auction procedure that guarantees incentive compatibility to measure 
willingness-to-pay for freight noise reduction. Actually, as explained by Cummings et al. (1997): “An 
allocative mechanism or institution is said to be incentive compatible when it rules provide individuals 
with incentives to truthfully and fully reveal their preferences”. In a laboratory economic experiment 
in the UPNA (Public University of Navarre) premises, respondents were endowed with real money 
that actually was paid as their WTP. It also enables us to make a comparison of this experiment with 
the results of a Contingent Valuation Survey by implementing a within-subject analysis. Trying to 
give a first insight of the results, it is found tha  respondents exhibit a significant hypothetical bi s, 
that is to say a hypothetical WTP being much greate than real WTP, and that a minor but significant 
part of them are zero protesters. Additionally, several explanatory variables of this bias have been 
identified and analysed. Thus, this paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 reviews the 
related literature with transport externalities and their corresponding WTP; while Section 3 presents all 
the details of our survey design. Additionally, Section 4 provides the empirical results related to the 
survey and Section 5 performs the results discussion. Finally, Section 6 provides the concluding 
outcomes. 
2. Literature review 
Research interest in freight transportation externalities has continuously expanded because of the 
increasing impacts on economy, environment, climate, and society. For example, Ranaiefar and Regan 
(2011) classified truck negative externalities in the four groups: firstly, social externalities, whic 
include noise pollution, accidents and visual intrusion; secondly, economic externalities that address 
congestion, road damages, and longer travel times; thirdly, ecologic externalities, which account for 
climate change and biodiversity destruction; and fially, environmental externalities for air pollution, 
water pollution and waste products. For a deeper description on main negative road freight 
transportation externalities, the reader is referred to Demir et al. (2015), who present a painstakingly 
analysis of the main transport externalities. 
A large set of methods can be considered in order to measure stated or revealed values regarding non-
market goods, e.g., nuisances, such values being either a willingness-to-pay to obtain a certain 















and McConnell, 2003). Other important references related to noise pollution caused by activities 
related to transportation are Malvestio et al. (2018), Rajeev et al. (2017), and Sen et al. (2017). 
2.1. WTP for Noise in the transportation sector  
Broadly speaking, the first characteristic in WTP elicitation through CVM is the discrepancy of stated 
values from a situation to another one. One of the initial studies regarding the evaluation of transport 
externalities costs was done by Wardman and Bristow (2004), who made stated preference studies of 
the monetary valuations of traffic related noise and air quality. Recent studies by Instamto et al. 
(2014a,b), with more than 5,200 respondents in fivecountries in the European Union (including 
Spain) provides WTP estimates for noise reduction having a median value between 20 and 40 euros. 
Restricting the scope to Spain, and in the same geographical area as the one presented in this study, 
Lera-Lopez et al. (2013), surveying 900 people, measured the mean WTP for noise reduction to be 
8.22 euros, and being around €12.78 for respondents living in a high-polluted area close to highways 
and exposed to a noise reduction scenario from 70dB to 50dB. This study has partly followed the 
Lera-Lopez et al.’s (2013, 2014) methodology and has implemented a survey in the Pamplona area 
(Navarre, Spain) in the surroundings of the Spanish Pyrenees. 
Thus, Lera-Lopez et al (2013, 2014), found, in their study in a similar scenario in Navarre (Spain) with 
different noise levels, an average WTP rather low rega ding the expected values in the literature: €9 on 
average based on 900 surveyed people. This result was also analogous to Arsenio et al. (2006) and 
Sanchez et al. (2018). Correspondingly, they also observed a high proportion of zero protests (around 
66%), i.e., people who consider that either they ar not responsible for the noise control policy or they 
are already paying enough taxes, what would imply a refusal to pay anything else. Likewise, a well-
established fact is that the mean response is generally g eater than the median of the same survey 
results, which reveals that the statistical distribution that fits those data is positively skewed. This 
situation is due to the high frequency of zero answer . 
In contrast, Istamto et al. (2014a) report a different range of mean and median values for WTP for 
noise reduction, which are respectively, €75 and €20, in a more generic scenario where respondents 
were confronted to the information regarding the noise effects in health, such as heart attacks, severe 
sleep disturbance, severe annoyance, or poor reading performance for children. A consequence of this 
description of real disturbances of noise on health, they managed to obtain higher values of WTP, 
even considering that their survey does not give any precise health impact regarding pollutants or 
noise as reported in this study. 
2.2. Hypothetical bias for noise damage in the transportati n sector 
The hypothetical bias refers to a situation where individuals state different amounts of willingness-to-
pay or willingness-to-accept for identical choices that differ only in the associated commitments. In 















amount of money for making a choice) and on the othr case, there is no commitment at all for the 
respondent (Hensher, 2010). Or much easier, it could assert that hypothetical bias can be defined as 
the difference between stated and revealed values (Murphy et al., 2005). Therefore, two questions 
arise about this hypothetical bias: the first one is related to its magnitude, the second one is concerned 
about the factors that potentially explain it. Generally speaking, it is agreed that the evidence supports 
the claim that hypothetical valuations exceed real valuations. Thus, Harrison and Rutström (2008), 
surveying 35 studies, computed the hypothetical bias (defined as the ratio hypothetical stated value 
over the real one -1) between -46% to 2600%, but concluded that there is a clear upward bias for 
hypothetical methods. In the field of transport environmental impacts, there had been even much more 
debate about the existence of such a bias (Fifer et al., 2014). 
3. Geographical scope and design of the experimental survey 
3.1. The survey geographical scope 
This study is focused on the Autonomous Community of Navarre in Northern Spain. The Navarrese 
region is located next to the border between Spain and France, being one of the seven European 
regions next to the Pyrenees: Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, Basque Country, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrenees, 
and Languedoc-Roussillon, apart from the Principality of Andorra. The first four regions are Spanish, 
while the following three regions take part of France, being Andorra an independent country. The 
selected study area was chosen because of its importance as a natural boundary between Spain and 
France, and crossing the Pyrenees is a challenging task for the transportation activities of logistic 
companies who want to move merchandises from the Iberian Peninsula to the rest of Europe, or vice 
versa. Thus, more than 130,000 vehicles, almost 25%of which are freight trucks, cross daily the 
Pyrenees (Spanish-French Observatory of Pyrenees Traffic, 2015). In fact, the Pyrenees is a region 
with very dense road transportation traffic, with the busiest routes located close to the mountains in 
Catalonia (La Junquera), and the Basque Country and N varre (Irún-Behovia) (Figure 1.a).  

















Fig. 1.a. Map of freight transportation crossing the Pyrenees in both 
directions. The bolder is the line, the more intensive is the traffic. 
Fig.1.b. Map of Navarre showing the main 




These routes cut through areas of great ecological value. Currently, these crossing points are greatly 
impacted as a result of road traffic. This research fo uses on the main international routes crossing the 
Pyrenees in Navarre. Thus, five main routes are considered (Figure 1.b), all crossing Pamplona (the 
capital of Navarre) and ending in France. These routes, which pass through various towns and 
villages, include from highways with heavy traffic to quiet national routes. 
3.2. Survey general description 
From a generic point of view, the survey combines a within-subject design by implementing both a 
hypothetical valuation survey (CVM) and a real-money economic experiment. For the real-money 
experiment, the Horowitz’s (2006) method was chosen, which implements a group presentation 
format. Technically speaking, the survey development took place in two large computer rooms that 
were available at the Public University of Navarre, in Pamplona (Spain). The selection of people 
taking part in the survey is based on the importance of having participants of different ages, income 
levels, and interests. Respondents for the survey came from two sources: i) newspaper advertisements 
and ii) a special call for the students at the Public University of Navarre made by their students’ 
representatives. Other participants were contacted by different methods in order to increase the 
candidates’ diversification in the selection process, but the two previously cited sources explain the 
origin of 85% of the participants. However, this selection procedure presents a great difference 
between the whole population in Navarre, and the sel cted sample, in young people (9.87% in 
population versus 52% in our sample) and old people (39% in population versus 4% in our sample) 
percentages. The reason of this bias in young and old people in due to the calls we made to participate 















advertisements in the local newspapers. Nevertheless, this bias was caused on purpose to avoid 
underestimating the WTP. According to Sanchez et al. (2018), Lera-Lopez et al. (2012), and Istamto et 
al. (2014a,b), there a risk of underestimation of WTP in a list of countries which includes Spain. 
Therefore, having the purpose of obtaining an accurate value for WTP, a greater percentage of young 
people were selected, because they are usually prone to give higher values of WTP in environmental 
externalities mitigation. 
Two successive sessions were carried out on June 7, 2014. Each session included 25 participants and 
took approximately 90 minutes. At the beginning of each session, each participant received written 
instructions that were read aloud by one of the experimenters. These instructions explain as clear as 
possible the entire sequence of actions that any survey respondent has to follow (see the Appendix A 
about the instructions for CVM and the economic experiment). These actions are also described in the 
following subsection. 
The main characteristics of the survey respondents are depicted in the Table 1. With regard to 
behavioral factors related to life styles and health, 26% of participants ate fruit, at least once a day, 
82% slept around 8 hours, 80% usually did sport and 26% smoked. Note that a half of the sample were 
not worried at all about noise, 60% were very interested in local economic and political issues; 
meanwhile 54% were very concerned by global economic and political issues. Finally, data from the 
performed surveys are available from authors on reason ble request. 
Table 1. Main characteristics of the survey participants in the economic experiment performed in the 
Public University of Navarre on June 7, 2014 
Variable \ Cat. N (participants) = 50 
Income level Less than 1,000€ 1,000€ - 1,700€ €1,700 - €2,800 More than €2,800 
% 12% 36% 26% 26% 
Age 18-24 
52% 
25-50 Older than 50 
% 44% 4% 
Occupation Student Unemployed Working Retired 
% 60% 14% 22% 4% 
Level of studies Low or no studies Medium level University training 
% 4% 28% 68% 
Gender Male Female 
% 48% 52% 
 
3.3. The survey sequence 
The survey is compounded of two sessions: a first one devoted to noise evaluation and a second one 
devoted to air pollution assessment. Both sessions have the same structure and search to elicit 
hypothetical and real WTP from the survey respondents related to noise and air pollution respectively. 
The noise survey is organized in two questionnaires called H1 and R1 (see Appendix A), which ask 
questions about noise WTP from the hypothetical (without economic experiment implementation) and 















survey (first session), an air pollution survey (second session) is built following the same 
methodological tenets than the noise one. Note that this paper pays the attention only to the noise 
survey. Within each session, there were three succesive steps (Figure 2). In a first step, two non-profit 
organizations aiming at promoting environmental protection and actions to reduce health and 
environmental damages due to transport noise and emissions were asked to make a presentation 
highlighting their contributions to improve transport externalities. These organizations explained their 
goals and the actions they were currently making in order to face air and noise pollution problems. 
The first organization was a local one, mainly focused on the region of Navarre, Red NELS 
(Association of Local Authorities from Navarre for Sustainable Development (see 
http://www.pamplona.es/VerPagina.asp?idPag=14835EN&idioma=1), and the second one was 
Greenpeace, with a representative from the Navarrese section (see 
https://greenwire.greenpeace.org/spain/es-ES/#). The organizations selection was essential to the 
methodological design, because both have as a mission to help respondents to enhance their WTP to 
mitigate externalities. Furthermore, the choice of a local and a global organization searches to have a 
close commitment of the respondents with environmental issues.   Before the survey development, 
each association was clearly asked for their activities n order to fight noise and air pollution caused by 
transportation in Navarre. The presentations order was randomly chosen, and each presentation lasted 
exactly 20 minutes. This procedure ensures some equity between organizations when the survey 
respondents will be further required to contribute financially to one of those associations. 
Figure 2. The noise survey sequence for each session 
   
After this presentation step, the survey respondents were asked to answer the noise survey that 
includes two questionnaires H1 and R1 (hereafter steps 2 and 3, respectively): H1 presents a survey to 
elicit hypothetical values of WTP and R1 presents a real-money experiment (See Appendix A for 
further details). Actually, in the sense of Carson and Groves (2007), Part 2 is inconsequential whereas 
Part 3 is consequential. Figure 2 describes the noise survey sequence for each session. 
During the hypothetical questionnaire H1, participants answered some questions related to noise issues 















proportion (WTP). During the answer to R1 questionnaire, they were requested to state first, which 
organization they would choose to donate and after, th  amount of money of their contribution. These 
amounts, either hypothetical or real incentivized, were chosen after respondents received specific 
information about the situation of the road transportation crossing the Pyrenees in Navarre and the 
traffic problems in Pamplona, along with their noise and environmental impacts. 
In each incentivized part (having a real-money experim nt), the same statement was proposed for each 
group member by implementing the group method explained in this paragraph. Thus, each participant 
in a 25 people-group was endowed with €60 (around US$66) from which the participant has complete 
availability. The estimation of this amount of €60 was based on earlier studies made by Lera-Lopez et 
al. (2013, 2014) where respondents had three possible b d prices: €15, €30 and €45. This €60 
endowment is designed to allow the respondents to pay the aforementioned amounts of money as a 
way to show their WTP. Nevertheless, it is clear that this budget constraint has also an important 
influence on the WTP the respondents would pay. 
Moreover, the hypothetical surveys were performed using a traditional answer sheet with a pencil, 
while the real-money experiments were conducted through individual computers under the Z-Tree 
Platform (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of each session, the associations were informed about the 
experiment results regarding the monetary contribution made by each group. Two sessions of 25 
participants were run in a single day (7 June 2014) in the premises of the Public University of Navarre, 
in Pamplona (Spain). 
3.4. The stated-preference valuation survey 
In the noise survey first step, the participants were r quired to state a hypothetical WTP after being 
exposed to successive noise levels of 70 dB(A) and 50 dB(A). After having heard those types of 
noises, they had to provide their WTP for a noise reduction from 70 dB(A) to 50 dB(A). Similar 
questions were designed to measure the sensitivity of he participant to a particular damage, their 
ecological distress, their local and global concern, a d their perception about the intensity of an 
environmental impact. Finally, other battery of questions was set to obtain information about 
individual traits of the survey respondents, such as gender, age, income level, social class, level of 
studies, car owning, self-report about health or sport doing, food, smoking and sleep habits, noise 
perception at home, or their knowledge about the non-pr fit organizations being present during the 
















3.5. The real-money experiment 
3.5.1. The revelation mechanism: A Group Format Auction 
In order to elicit WTP for noise pollution reduction in the incentivized section of the survey, a 
valuation experiment inspired by Horowitz et al. (1999) and Horowitz (2006; 2008) was run that 
builds upon a group presentation format. This format ensures a truthful revelation of individual 
willingness-to-pay. The experimental procedure is de cribed as follows. In the group format, each 
participant belonging to a group of size N is enquired to state her/his WTP to obtain a certain level of 
reduction for a given damage; by indicating how much of a given endowment €E s/he would be ready 
to allocate to reducing damage actions.  
All WTP statements were anonymous and simultaneously collected through a computer in a first 
round. In the second round, the revealed WTPs are ranked from the lowest value €bi to the highest one, 
€Bi where i=1,…,N. Then, let it be €x a random number uniformly generated between €bi and €Bi. 
Therefore, the following rule is applied to settle individual payoffs. If more than 50% of the individual 
statements that lie between €bi and €Bi are greater or equal to €x, then each group member gets 
privately €(E-x) and, as a consequence, €Nx are allocated to environmental damage reduction. 
Conversely, if less than 50% of individual statements (comparison with the median bid) are greater or 
equal to €x, then each group member gets privately €E and nothing is allocated to environmental 
damage reduction. The Figure 3 explains the aforementioned auction mechanism. 
This procedure frames a standard WTP experiment for a collective choice, as the experiment 
highlights, on one hand, the valuation exercise at the individual level of each participant, and, on the
other hand, on a public choice decision, since the individual values are used to make a collective 
choice. Thus, this auction mechanism ensures full revelation of individual preferences. Other 
experimental procedures, frequently used for valuation, as for instance the Becker-De Groot-Marschak 
(BDM) methodology, (Becker et al., 1964) or the Second Price Vickrey’s Auction (Vickrey, 1961) 
should also ensure this full revelation of preferences. Nevertheless, the Group Format compared to 
aforementioned procedures has the advantage of highlighting clearly the public choice dimension of 
the environmental valuation problem faced by individuals, due to the fact that noise pollution is a 
negative externality. Moreover, the median-value or median-voter approach, that was applied in this 
case, has some interesting properties, and it is incentive compatible under a broad range of conditions. 
It is not the case for BDM procedure or Vickers’ Auction, as it was established by Horowitz (2006) 
and also empirically highlighted by Bohm (2008) for the BDM procedure. 
















3.5.2. A numerical example describing the cost assignment process in the auction mechanism 
The group format presented above and used in this survey is the same as the Random Price Voting 
Mechanism presented by Messer et al. (2010). A key characteristic of such mechanisms is that a 
purely self-interested individual has a weakly dominant strategy to bid her/his true value. Let us 
briefly illustrate why the group procedure is incentive-compatible with a simple numerical example.  
Assume three risk-neutral bidders, each one denoted by i (i=1, 2, 3) that have home-grown values for 
noise reduction that are WTP1= €1, WTP2= €0.5 and WTP3= €0, and that they should report a bid i for 
reducing noise. Note that individual values are normalized between €0 and €1 for simplicity, in the 
same way that probabilities lie also between 0 and 1. Let assume also that each bidder gets an 
endowment €E = €1. According to the assumptions described in the previous paragraphs that if x, the 
random price for reducing environmental damage is higher than the median bid, no damage reduction 
is implemented whereas all bidders would pay €x if x is higher than the median bid. 
Thus, let us assume €x to be uniformly distributed between the minimum value (€0) and the maximum 
value (€1). In the experiment, each bidder gets a payoff of € (WTPi-x) if the public good is created 
(i.e., damage reduction is implemented) and €0 (zero) otherwise. Let us consider firstly the median 
bidder. If s/he reports her/his true bid (i.e., b2= €0.5), her/his expected payoff is the probability of 
having an x lower or equal than 0.5 multiplied by the differenc  between her/his true value and the 
expected price of the public good, plus the probability of having x higher than 0.5 multiplied by zero 
(as bidders do not get any private value if the public good is not created). The expected price if 
 ≤ 0.5 is, given the properties of uniform distribution, €0.25 and as a consequence the expected 































Assume now that the median bidder underbids (e.g., reports b2=€0.3 instead of €0.5). As the median 
bid equals now €0.3, the expected price conditional to the fact that x ≤ €b2 is (€0.3- €0)/2 = €0.15. 
Her/his expected payoff is therefore 0.3(€0.5-€0.15) + 0.7(€0) = €0.105, which is lower than the 
expected payoff of reporting the true value. If sheov rbids, e.g., reports a bid that is b2=€0.7, then the 
expected price assuming x ≤ €b2 is now €0.7/2=€0.35. The expected payoff is now 0.7(€0.5-€0.35) + 
0.3(€0) = €0.105, which is also less than when she tells the truth. That is, for the median bidder, the
dominant strategy is to tell the truth. 
Now, we are going to analyse the situation of the other bidders that are not median bidders. Basically, 
they have no incentives to bid above or under their true value since the outcome only depends on the 
median bid, and this median value is not affected by any deviation in their bid. Moreover, bidders do 
not know whether or not they are the minimum, maximum, or median ones. That is to say, the support 
of price expectations for them goes from 0 to endowment €E = €1. If the non-median bidder reports 
her/his true value, his expected payoff would be 0.5(0.2-0.25) + 0.5(0) = -0.025. For instance, if bidder 
3 reports €0.2 instead of zero, the probability of having x less or equal than 0.5 (which is the median 
value between 0 and 1) does not change, and therefor  it is not possible to increase his expected payoff 
by overbidding. The expected payoff remains -0.025, since the non-median bidder does not know 
where the median bid is, and therefore should assume a edian bid of 0.5. A similar argument can be 
used for underbidding, or for bidder 3. Non-median bidders are indifferent between telling the truth or 
lying where median bidder prefer to tell the truth. Consequently, truthful revelation by all bidders is a 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of this game, as shown by Messer et al. (2010).  
4. The survey results 
This section presents the results from analysing the surveys. It starts by describing the zero protest 
issue found in survey, and ends with the elicitation of WTPs and the hypothetical bias. 
4.1. The zero-protest issue 
Questionnaires play a crucial role in the correct application of CVM. Usually, CVM questionnaires 
have three main sections: an introduction to ensure the respondents have well understood the problem, 
the contingent valuation process itself, and finally, classifying questions about statistical 
characteristics of the respondent. Dealing with CVM surveys implies dealing with proportionally large 
amount of zero-response that should be treated adequ tely because some of them may be genuine ones 
and others may not.  
Differentiation between a genuine zero WTP and a protest response is carried out by a set of questions 
located at the second section of the questionnaire (qu stionnaire H1, see Appendix A). There, some 
questions are placed to find out possible reasons fr unwillingness to pay, that it to say, a willingness 
to pay that equals to zero. Based on the answers to these questions, researchers decide whether a zero 















respondents that even valuing positively the proposed scenario, they are not willing to pay anything. 
Table 2 contents debriefing questions to detect zero-protest. 
On the one hand, Q1, Q2, and, Q3 cover reals zeros since those are people that do not value, at least 
positively, economically the hypothetical proposed scenario.  On the other hand, whenever 
respondents agree Q4 and/or Q5, even agreeing with at least one of the other three statements, they are 
protesting and their zeros become zero-protest. 
 
Table 2. Questions to detect zero-protest (Q3 in questionnaire H1) 
If WTP = 
0   
Reason for unwillingness to pay 
Y/N 
Q1 I am not aware of any traffic noise at home.  
Q2 I do not think my health is affected by traffic noise.  
Q3 I would pay more for more effective traffic noise abatement.  
Q4 
The traffic noise is not my fault. People who cause the noise are the 
ones who should pay for it. 
Q5 The taxes I am paying already should cover that.  
 
When respondents do not say their genuine value, CVM may fail to elicit the correct economic value. 
Moreover, it is common that zero responses represent a high percentage of the answers. Generally, 
protesters arise in two ways: respondents who statea zero WTP although their true WTP is higher than 
zero (protest zeros) or those who say a very high amount that is much greater than their true WTP 
(Lindsey, 1994). However, the former occurs much often than the latter. Boyle (2003) gave three main 
reasons to understand why respondents do not express th ir genuine WTP: (i) some respondents 
simply may not understand what they are asked (ii ) strategic answer: some people do not have to 
reveal their true preferences to prevent them from being taken into account to increase prices/taxes, 
and (iii ) respondents may protest against the survey.  
Protest zeros are often removed from the database (Andersson, 2007; Bateman et al., 2011). In this 
way, the bias caused by their inclusion is reduced. The drawback of this method is that potentially 
useful information is lost and would also include some selection bias. Thus, it would be assuming that 
the willingness to pay of this protest group would be the same as those who would not respond to the 
survey. In that case, zero-protesters are identified and included as a dummy variable in the statistical 
analysis.  
4.2. The elicitation of WTPs and the hypothetical bias 
The main purpose of the survey was the comparison individual responses that occurred in a 
hypothetical context to the responses that are given by the same participants in an incentivized context. 















survey was between €24 and €27 per year and per person, depending on the considered sample (Table 
3). These results are similar to those ones developed by Istamto et al. (2014a,b) who found values 
ranging between €20 to €30. Therefore, comparable outcomes are found in this research, even with 
small samples compared to larger studies. 
Table 3. Basic statistics about WTP for noise reduction in our study (values given in euros) 
 
 Full sample Without zero protesters 
WTP for noise 
reduction, 
Hypothetical 
WTP for noise 
reduction, Real-
Money 
WTP for noise 
reduction, 
Hypothetical 
WTP for noise 
reduction, Real-
Money 
Median 7.50 5.00 10.00 5.00 
Mean 24.02 9.54 27.29 10.25 
Standard 
Deviation 
40.61 13.31 50.63 13.80 
Observations # 50 50 44 44 
 
Thus, considering the survey context, a strong bias for the average WTP was found, being more than 
twice higher in the hypothetical survey compared to the incentivized survey. Actually, when compute 
the Lden level for the punctual noise of 70 dB(A) during one minute, and then 50 dB(A) all over the 
day (by using www.ohcow.on.ca/uploads/Resource/noisecalculator.xls), it is obtained approximately 
50 dB(A) Lden. It is interesting to note that the average (real) value of €9.5 here reported to reduce 
noise level from 70 to 50 dB(A) is connected to thedamage cost for 51dB(A) Lden, given by 
European Commission (2014) for Spain (€8). Developing a t-test for the hypothetical WTPs, it results 
significantly different from real incentives ones (t=-2.02, p=0.0457) so both means are statistically 
different each other at any level of significance gr ater than 4.6%. If zero-protests are removed, the 
same conclusion arises, with stronger evidence: both means are statistically different from each other 
at any level greater than 3.6%. There is a huge dispersion of individual WTPs, as can be observed in 
Figure 4. Due to the fact that the real-money survey provides an endowment of €60 to participants, the 
distribution values are truncated in the top area. Therefore, the question is the relationship between th  
real-money WTPs and the hypothetical ones. It would be possible to conjecture that incentivized 
values have no relationship with stated ones, but they were only related to the given endowment to 
participants.  
Figure 4. Distribution (Box Plot) of participants’ WTP in the real-money and in the hypothetical 

















Additionally, there is a positive relationship betwen hypothetical stated values and real WTPs: the 
higher the hypothetical WTP is observed, the higher t  real one is obtained (see Table 4). Regarding 
socio-economic variables, significant effects for sme control variables have been obtained. Therefore, 
a Tobit regression was run in hypothetical WTP control variables to identify protesters (Table 5). In 
our research, we analyze the influence of some determinants on the amount the respondents are willing 
to pay. The problem is that in this type of questionnaire, respondents often give the answer 0 for WTP. 
If we ignore this fact, the results of the estimates will be biased and inconsistent because WTP values 
are truncated at 0, i.e. nobody can place a negative WTP. Therefore, we should censor somehow those 
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Where 	

∗, is the latent variable of the willingness to pay, 	
  is the amount expressed by each of 
the respondents  , 		
  the vector of independent variables, and 
	 the error term. Econometrical 
analyses were made using the GRETL software (http://gretl.sourceforge.net/) due to its specific 
characteristics: it is free, easy-to-use, and effici nt and powerful for the intended work in this paper.  
Note that for the regressions validity, all necessary assumptions have been tested including 
the classical ones held in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) study in Table 4. With regard to 
Tobit models in Table 5 and Table 6, they have been estimated using robust standard errors 
for getting heteroscedasticity consistent estimations. Moreover, the test for normality of errors 
is available in Table 5. Nevertheless, the model displayed in Table 6 suffers from significant 















variable consists of the natural logarithm of a ratio, so many observations had to be removed 
in order to obtain results having mathematical meaning. Therefore, insights from Tobit in 
Table 6 should not be literally taken into consideration, but the signs of the independent 
variables are still valid. For further information about econometrical models, readers are 
referred to Wooldridge (2013). 
 
Table 4. OLS, using observations 1-50 
Dependent variable: Real-Money WTP 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
Constant 7.159 1.872 3.82 0.0004 ***  
Hypothetical WTP 0.099 0.021 4.827 <0.0001 ***  
 
Mean dependent var  9.540  S.D. dependent var  13.314 
Sum squared resid  7539.054  S.E. of regression  12.533 
R-squared  0.132  Adjusted R-squared  0.114 
F(1, 48)  23.299  P-value(F)  0.000014 
Log-likelihood −196.343  Akaike criterion  396.686 
Schwarz criterion  400.509  Hannan-Quinn  398.142 
 
 
Table 5. Tobit, using observations 1-50 
Dependent variable: Hypothetical WTP for noise reduction 
QML standard errors 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
Constant −475.079 219.153 −2.168 0.0302 **  
Health 6.971 13.664 0.510 0.6099  
AUDITION 43.238 28.920 1.495 0.1349  
SPORT 15.691 24.528 0.640 0.5224  
SLEEP −28.559 20.357 −1.403 0.1606  
FRUIT −6.353 32.714 −0.194 0.8460  
Car 27.661 25.780 1.073 0.2833  
Noise_Concern 20.953 8.588 2.440 0.0147 **  
Student 88.383 40.225 2.197 0.0280 **  
Low_Income −74.255 28.175 −2.636 0.0084 ***  
Mid Low 4.230 23.264 0.182 0.8557  
Mid High −65.424 23.734 −2.757 0.0058 ***  
Gender 20.582 20.459 1.006 0.3144  
Age 3.642 2.040 1.786 0.0742 * 
Training 67.132 29.965 2.240 0.0251 **  
Local sens 1.937 17.820 0.109 0.9134  
World sens −8.340 18.440 −0.452 0.6511  
Ecol sens 67.170 25.435 2.641 0.0083 ***  
PRT −443.781 130.79 −3.393 0.0007 ***  
 
Chi-square(18)  96.63001  p-value  9.14e-13 
Log-likelihood −158.0819  Akaike criterion  356.1638 
Schwarz criterion  394.4043  Hannan-Quinn  370.7260 
 















 Left-censored observations: 22
 Right-censored observations: 0 
Test for normality of residual - 
 Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed 
 Test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 34.4908 
 with p-value = 3.239e-008 
 
NB: ‘Health’ is the self-reported state of health, from 1 (excellent) to 5 (very bad), ‘Audition’ is a dummy equal 
to 1 in case of hearing problem, ‘Sleep’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the participant reported 7-8 hrs of sleep or 
more, ‘Fruit’ a dummy for consuming regularly fruits and vegetables, ‘Car’ is 1 for having a car, ‘Noise 
Concern’ is the self-reported index for noise annoyance (from 1, no worries, to 5, very worried), ‘student’ is a 
dummy, ‘low income’ is for income less than 1,000€ per month, mid-low for income between 1,000 and 1,700€ 
and mid-high for income between 1,700 and 2,800€. ‘Gender’ equals 1 for male, ‘age’ is self-reported age, 
‘training’ is for the level of education (from 1 ‘basic’ to 4 ‘university level’), ‘local sens’ is the self-reported 
sensitivity towards local economy and politics (from 1 not interested in, to 4 very interested), ‘world sens’ is the 
global sensitivity with the same scale as the previous one, ‘ecol-sens’ is a dummy equals to 1 in caseof having 
an ecological sensitivity and ‘PRT’ is a dummy that take the value 1 in case of being a zero-protester.  
Accordingly, the dummy variable identifying the protesters answers is PRT. The protesters WTP is 
significantly lesser than the non-protester ones (significant at the 1% level). Other statistical variable 
having a negative impact on the stated WTPs is the income level variable (discretized in the 
regression), as low-income participants report a significantly lower WTPs, but also intermediate 
income levels (income between €1700 and €2800) present the same situation. Conversely, the 
variables representing the variables of ecological sensitivity, noise concern, level of education 
(training), being a student, (and, to a less extent, age), have a positive impact on WTP levels. 
In particular, evidence is discovered for noise concer  and ecological sensitivity to increase 
(hypothetical) WTPs when the respondent is a student (60% of the sample). Hence, these results are 
habitual regarding socioeconomic determinants of WTP level to avoid nuisances as it was presented in 
the literature review section. Finally, the last important point is about the hypothetical bias and its 
determinants. According to the Harrison and Rutstrom’s (2008) methodology, the natural logarithm of 
the ratio between the hypothetical WTP (WTPH) and the real-money WTP (WTPR) was considered as a 
measure regarding the intensity of this bias. Furthermore, the model was restrained to participants for 
which the hypothetical value is higher than the real one. Due to this restriction, many observations 
were removed (31 participants are dropped from the analysis). Thus, a Tobit regression was performed 
in the Table 6 to explain this ratio, where explanatory variables are the socioeconomic characteristics. 
Surprisingly, and even if the robustness of these rsults can be put into doubt, as previously stated, 
some interesting features are found.   
In particular, the variables describing the following events: concern about noise level, owing a car, a 
higher level of diploma or to be a male, increases th  discrepancy between hypothetical and real value. 
















Table 6.  Tobit, using observations 1-50 (n = 19)
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 31 
Dependent variable: ln(WTPH/WTPR) 
QML standard errors 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
Constant 13.979 9.699 1.441 0.14954  
Fruit -0.980 0.998 -0.982 0.32630  
Car 2.952 1.319 2.238 0.02521 **  
Noise concern 0.652 0.235 2.773 0.00555 ***  
Student -2.702 1.520 -1.778 0.07547 * 
Low income -5.428 3.535 -1.535 0.12470  
Med. income 2.867 1.501 1.909 0.05622 * 
Gender 1.714 0.678 2.528 0.01148 **  
Age -0.400 0.173 -2.319 0.02038 **  
Training 1.814 0.694 2.615 0.00892 ***  
Local sens. -2.287 0.760 -3.007 0.00264 ***  
World sens. 0.330 0.396 0.835 0.40391  
Ecol. Sens. -6.934 4.291 -1.616 0.10609  
 
Chi-square(12)  331.8962  p-value  9.19e-64 
Log-likelihood -13.27395  Akaike criterion  54.54789 
Schwarz criterion  67.77004  Hannan-Quinn  56.78560 
 
 sigma = 0.598312 (0.107655) 
 Left-censored observations: 6 
 Right-censored observations: 0 
 
5. Discussion 
Using the experimental economics methodology to estimate WTPs for noise abatement in Spain is the 
main contribution of this paper in relation to the lit rature. Furthermore, the first novelty of this work 
is the research of the hypothetical bias issue which, to the best of authors’ knowledge, has never been 
investigated in the noise transportation area using a within-subject method. Moreover, the second 
novelty is the introduction of group dimension in the method for eliciting individual WTP for transport 
noise abatement. 
Likewise, results clearly indicate the existence of hypothetical bias in the WTP estimation, even with a 
small number of observations. Additionally, the WTP levels are similar to previous studies 
implemented in the same Spanish regions (Lera -Lopez et al., 2014), providing a proof of the 
robustness of this study. Moreover, increasing hypothetical bias can be observed (i.e., higher 
hypothetical WTPs than real ones), depending on the s atistic function used in Table 3, from 50% 
(comparison of medians) to more than 160% (comparison of means), which is in accordance with the 
literature related to the topic (Harrison and Rustrom, 2008; List and Gallet, 2001). Actually, List and 
Gallet (2001) report that Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert Solow (both Nobel Prize in Economics) 
recommended that hypothetical bids should be deflated using a ‘divide by 2’ rule, unless these bids 















obtained as hypothetical bias in this work. Concerning the limitations of this study and its 
methodology, it is clear that some biases could have undermined the results. The first limitation of the
current work would be a selection bias, because the survey participants knew beforehand they could 
have a monetary compensation for taking part in the survey. Therefore, the question which is raised 
here is whether or not the participants selected in this way can be considered as representative of the 
whole local population in Navarre. Moreover, as data re collected from one particular geographical 
area: ‘the Navarrese Pyrenees’ in Spain, results may not be valid for somewhere else’. To this respect, 
Abeler and Nosenzo (2015) address this issue implementing a laboratory experiment having 
participants of different origins: a first group rec uited following the monetary reward; a second group 
appealed by the altruistic desire of helping research; and a third group recruited attracted by both 
arguments. These authors found that participants are m inly motivated by monetary rewards, but they 
did not find any significant differences between the ree groups of participants in relation to their pro-
social preferences, their risk preferences or their cognitive skills. The second limitation of this work is 
clearly the stake size bias, as it is possible to say that final amounts of WTPs are closely related to the 
endowment level assigned to each participant. There is a clear evidence indicating that the rise in stake 
sizes does not affect the role of pro-social preferences, in particular regarding bargaining games 
(Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999). A recent experimental study developed by Fehr et al. 
(2014) shows that, even in a very competitive environment, huge variations in stake size, from twice 
or three times the monthly income of participants to ten time of that amount, has influence neither on 
the magnitude of social awareness nor on individual effort behaviors. Therefore, this result supports 
the validity of the methodology here exposed.  Finally, the last possible bias is related to the extrinsic 
incentives that are present in the experiment design, because those participants actually received some 
money as an endowment. Then, it could be stated that, giving a positive amount of money, in contrast 
to a non-reward situation, the participants would pay a higher WTP with higher probability. This 
assertion has not been confirmed by experimental evidence, because giving monetary incentives may 
crowd out intrinsic incentives to provide value to public goods or environmental issues. A discussion 
of these adverse effects of monetary extrinsic incentiv s is provided by Gneezy et al. (2011). They 
conclude that different kinds of incentives should be considered in the evaluation of the participants’ 
response interaction. In the survey, there are partially monetary extrinsic incentives, but not non-
monetary incentives, such as associations promoting their actions to keep a safe environment. Thus, 
such intrinsic motives were moderately control by means of a set of individual questions that try to 
elicit those motives and use them as explanatory variables. Consequently, after having contrasted the 
results and the methodology with the aforementioned references and literature, individual results 















6.  Concluding comments 
Apart from previous considerations this study contribu es to the research literature measuring the 
traffic noise damage costs in several ways in a very specific context,. Firstly, the individual values that 
are obtained are close to the ones found in previous st dies. Secondly, strong evidence for the 
existence of a hypothetical bias is obtained. 
Moreover, this study is innovative with two main points, being the first one to propose an elicitation of 
traffic-related noise values for Spain, and also, being the first one to implement a group method to 
measure WTP instead of the traditional individual methods. It could be considered that the group 
dimension is a key methodology to measure traffic noise costs and, more generally, transport 
nuisances’ costs, because they are related to public goods for which the collective concern is crucial. 
Besides, the second point of this study innovation is the definition of clear insights regarding 
economic values that could be used in order to quantify oise impact for transport infrastructure 
projects. These insights are particularly valuable wh n costs and benefits are compared, being relevant 
for helping public decision-making in the area of transport policy. In fact, from a practical point of 
view, it could be possible to design an environmental oise toll for the group of trucks crossing the 
aforementioned area of the Pyrenees in a specific per od of time (usually one hour), valued on, at least, 
the mean of the WTP without zero-protests (€10.25) per affected person in that area, when the noise 
level was overcoming the 50 dB(A) threshold but below 70 dB(A). Other types of estimations could 
be done for other noise level intervals, designing a toll system in order to mitigate and control the 
noise impact of freight transportation. 
Thus, concerning real WTP values, Arsenio et al (2006) used a stated-preferences survey in Lisbon, 
and found a WTP value for noise reduction per year and household being around €51.60. Even though 
a direct comparison between results is impossible, hypothetical WTP values for Spain obtained in this 
research halves the Arsenio’s calculations and real values that are five times lesser. On the other hand, 
if comparing the results of this study with Martin et al. (2006) ones, which implemented the survey in 
Valladolid (Spain), similar values are obtained (€7.22 euros per person per year versus € 9.54 in this 
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Appendix A: Survey instructions (translated from Spanish, not to be published, 











Welcome to this survey-experiment. The study you are going to take part has the only purpose the 
academic research and its results will be published in scientific journals. Therefore, no commercial 
exploitation of results will be done. The answers you are going to give will be anonymous, which 
means that nobody, including the researchers, will be able to know who answered this questionnaire 
 
 
A. Noise Analysis 
 
(FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS)  
Public University of Navarra has estimated the level of noise to which you are exposed living as you 
do in the vicinity of the AP-7/N-II/C-17/C-16/C-14 roads at 70 decibels, which is equivalent to the 
noise made by a heavy truck or a vacuum cleaner.  This recording will give you an idea of how loud 
this is [HIGH NOISE RECORDING] 
  
 
Q.1. Compared with the recording you have just heard, the level of noise you hear from your home 
is… 
 
a. …much louder 1 
b. …a bit louder 2 
c. …the same / very similar 3 
d. …a bit softer 4 
e. … much softer 5 
 
 
The Navarrese Government is considering measures such as the installation of acoustic panels for 
which they might ask all the citizens to pay a compulsory tax, similar to the one paid for garbage 
collection. Imagine that this measure would reduce the noise level from 70 to 50 decibels (like the 
noise made by a washing machine). You will now hear a brief recording of the current noise level 
followed by one of the reduced level [COMBINED RECORDING -  FRAGMENT OF HIGH 




















1) Noise Hypothetical treatment 
 
 
Q.2. How much would you be willing to pay per year and household for a period of 5 years to 
achieve a 40% reduction in the noise level affecting your home? Keep in mind that the money 




Q.3. (if answer Q.2.=0) Given that you are unwilling to pay any sum at all, please indicate whether 
you agree (A) or disagree (D) with the following statements: 
 
 A D 
a. I am not aware of any traffic noise at home 1 2 
b. I cannot afford to pay because my income is too low 1 2 
c. I do not think my health is affected by traffic noise 1 2 
d. I would pay more for more effective traffic noise abatement  1 2 
e. The traffic noise is not my fault. People who cause the noise are 
who should pay for it.  1 2 
f. The taxes I am paying already should cover it  1 2 



























2) Noise real treatment 
 
With regard to noise, the two experiment collaborative entities (Red NELS and GreenPeace) perform 
activities related to noise abatement that later have positive implications for the citizens of Navarra. 
For instance: 
1) Red NELS supports local entities to the implementation of projects of Local Action Plans 
(Agendas Locales 21), many of them related to mitigation, control, and awareness of noise 
reduction. 
2) GreenPeace participates in noise environmental importance awareness emitted by vehicles, 
making goods distribution companies to design protocols focused on noise abatement. 
 
We will provide you 60 euros which you could invest part of them in fight against noise, giving us the
authorization to transfer a portion of this amount to one of the associations you choose. You will keep 
the remaining money through a bank transfer. In addition, the sum to be eventually received by the 
chosen associations will be determined as follows: 
 
a) You are located in a 25 participants group. Each of these participants will indicate through a 
computer how much money of 60 euros will allocate to one of the above associations (let us 
call this individual amount x, in euros). 
 
b) Anonymously, we will collect the 25 payment proposals. Later, the computer will sort them 
from the lowest to the greatest amount. Let us call xMin the lowest proposal and xMax the 
greatest one. You will not know the money proposed by the other participants, just as the other 
participants will not know how much you propose. 
 
c) The computer will select randomly a number between 0 and 60 euros. All values between 0 
and 60 have the same probability. Let us call Y this random number. 
 
d) If most of the x values proposed by participants are greater than Y (for example, in a 25 
people group, if 13 propose an amount x greater than or equal to Y), then the association that 
had been chosen will receive the amount of 25*Y. At the end of the experiment, each 
participant will receive a individual amount of (60-Y) euros. 
 
e) If most of the x values proposed by the participants are lower than Y, then the selected 
association does not receive any money and each partici nt will receive the amount of 60 
euros. 
 
An example would be useful here. Suppose that participant 1 proposes to pay 5 euros to one of the 
associations, that participant 2 proposes to pay 10 euros, (etc.) and the participant 25 proposes to pay 
55 euros. In this situation, the minimum would be 5 and the maximum 55. The computer will choose a 















i. Suppose the random number obtained is 25. If more than he 50% of the participants are 
willing to pay 25 euros or more, then the association would receive 25 * 25 euros = 625 euros. 
In this case, at the end, each participant would actually obtain 60 - 25 = 35 euros. 
ii. Suppose the random number obtained is 35. If more than 50% of the participants choose to 
pay an amount lower than 35 euros, then the selected association would receive 0 euros and 























ROAD TRAFFIC NOISE EVALUATION SURVEY-EXPERIMENT- June 
2014 
 




Q.4. Did you know GreenPeace before this experiment? 
 
a.      Yes 1 
b.      No 2 
 
 
Q.5. Did you know Red NELS before this experiment? 
 
a. Yes 1 
b. No 2 
 
 
Q.6. How would rate your health over the last 12 months? 
 
a. Excellent 1 
b. Good 2 
c. Satisfactory 3 
d. Poor 4 
e. Very poor 5 
 
 
Q.7. Now, please answer YES or NO to following statements about your lifestyle habits. 
 
 YES NO 
a. I smoke  1 2 
b. I have or have had hearing problems  1 2 
c. I do sport or take a walk at least 3 times 
as week 
1 2 
d. I sleep between 7 and 8 hours a day 1 2 
e. I eat 4 or  5 pieces of fruit and/or 
vegetables every day  
1 2 

















Q.8. Using the following scale, would you please indicate your degree of concern regarding the 





Q.9. Using the following scale, would you please indicate your degree of concern regarding the 





Q.10. How many people from each of the following groups make up your household? 
 
a. Children (up to 10 years of age)  
b. Adolescents (11 to 18 years of age)  
c. Adults  
d. Pensioners  
 
 




Q.12. What is your job? (Answer jointly with question 15) 
 
 
Q.13.  What is the current job of the main earner in your household? (Retired people, please state 
previous job, widows/widowers please state job of the deceased person). 
Self-employed: Q.14 Q.15 
Self-employed in business, retail, or industry 1 1 
Crop farmer, Livestock farmer…………………. 2 2 
Liberal professional……………………………... 3 3 
Self-employed tradesman……………………… 4 4 
Employee:   
Director, Manager……………………………….. 5 5 
High-level tenured post, High level technician 6 6 
High-ranking civil servant………………………. 7 7 
Middle-ranking civil servant…………………….. 8 8 
Mid-level tenured post, Middle manager……… 9 9 
Commercial agent / representative……………. 10 10 
Non-degree civil service post………………….. 11 11 
Administrative worker, Office clerk .. ……………. 12 12 
Salesperson, retail sales assistant ....... ……………. 13 13 
Skilled worker……………….…………………… 14 14 
a. Not at all concerned  1 
b. Slightly concerned  2 
c. Moderately concerned  3 
d. Very concerned  4 
e. Extremely concerned  5 
a. Not at all concerned  1 
b. Slightly concerned  2 
c. Moderately concerned  3 
d. Very concerned  4 















Unskilled worker, Labourer…………………….. 15 15 
Apprentice, Junior……………………………….. 16 16 
No occupation:   
Unemployed……………………………………… 17 17 
Student…………………………………………… 18 - 
Retired / Pensioner……………………………… 19 - 




Q.14. Now, taking into account all current sources, where would you say your total average monthly 
household income falls on the following scale? 
 
a. More than 4.000 euros 
b. Levels in between (Go to Q.15) 
c. Less than 1000 euros 
 
 
Q.15.  More specifically, how would you estimate your household income on the following scale? 
 
a.  2.801 to 4.000 euros per month  
b.  1.701 euros to 2.800 euros per month 
c. 1001 euros to 1.700 euros per month 




Q.16.  If you have chosen not to answer questions 16 and 17, are you willing to indicate which 









Q.17.  Do you mind telling us your gender? 
 
a. Male 1 









Q.19.  And your education level? 
 
a. None/primary 1 
b. Lower secondary 2 
c. Upper secondary or vocational  3 
Upper   
Upper-middle  
Middle-middle   
















d. University  4 



























Q.22. Do you consider yourself sensitive to ecological issues?   
 
a. Yes 1 
b. No 2 
c. I do not know 3 
 
 
a. Not interested at all 1 
b. A little interested 2 
c. Something interested 3 
d. Very interested 4 
e. I do not know 5 
a. Not interested at all 1 
b. A little interested 2 
c. Something interested 3 
d. Very interested 4 
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• A Contingent Valuation Analysis and an economic experimental auction were conducted in 
Navarre (Spain) developing a suitable survey for willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid noise 
pollution due to transport. 
 
• We have measured the hypothetical bias for traffic noise WTP. 
 
• We infer that hypothetical WTP for noise reduction s more than twice the real WTP. 
 
• We have identified some key socio-demographic variables for hypothetical bias. 
 
 
